KONFLIK PADA LEVERAGE POLICY DAN DIVIDEND POLICY

Abstract

Shareholders debtholders and management (managers) are parties that have different interest and perspective regarding value of the firm. Shareholders will tend to maximize their shares. Forcing managers to act in their interest despite of debtholders interest. Debtholders on the other side will protect their funds that already placed in firm with covenant and strict monitoring policy. Conflict of interest between parties in firm is known as agency problems.

From an analysis of the effect of agency conflict among the groups suggests that the proportion of equity controlled by insiders (Managerial Ownership) should influence the firm’s policies.

Condition in Indonesia may vary, but generally found that dividend policy has a negative and significant relationship with the managerial ownership, means when the company has a liw leverage policy there is a tendency for the company to joint with managerial ownership programs. While this general conditions may is not perfectly applicable in a specific situation in term if period as well as industries.

Key words: agency problems, agency theory, managerial ownership, agency conflict, agency cost